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Abstract
The concept of paradeduction is presented in order to justify that
we can overlook contradictory information taking into account only
what is consistent. Besides that, paradeduction is used to show that
there is a way to transform any logic, introduced as an axiomatic
formal system, into a paraconsistent one.
1 Introduction
As usual, we take a consequence structure as a pair (X,Cn) such that X is
a non-empty set and Cn is an operation in the powerset of X :
Cn : ℘(X)→ ℘(X)
It is well known that if A ⊆ X , then Cn(A) is the set of consequences of A.
Moreover, if Cn(A) 6= X , we say that A is Cn-consistent. Exploring logics
from this abstract perspective is the basic idea developed by A. Tarski in [8]
and [9].
Dealing with consequence structures (i.e. logics) in a recent paper (see
[4]), we have proposed a method to show that it is possible to turn any
explosive logic into a system able to deal with contradictions, answering,
therefore, a problem posed in [2]: how to convert a given explosive logic into
a paraconsistent one? We have used concepts from category theory to define
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an endofunctor in the category of consequence structures in such a way that
given a logic in which ex falso holds we are able to generate a paraconsistent
counterpart of it by means of a paraconsistentization functor.
Indeed, we have showed that, given a consequence structure (X,Cn), it
is feasible to construct a paraconsistent version of it, denoted by (X,CnP ),
in such a way that, for A ⊆ X and a ∈ X , we have that: a ∈ CnP (A) if, and
only if, there is a A′ ⊆ A Cn-consistent such that a ∈ Cn(A′). This is highly
abstract. So, in this paper, the syntactical notion of axiomatic formal system
is presented as well as the semantical notion of valuation structures. Then,
given an axiomatic formal system S with an underlying notion of deduction
in S, we build the concept of paradeduction in S which will have a close
connection with the construction proposed in [4]. Using syntactical as well
semantical consequence relations we are able to determine whether some
metalogical properties are invariant under paraconsistentization providing,
thus, an answer to a question left open in [4].
2 Axiomatic formal systems
From the viewpoint of proof theory, logics can be introduced in some different
ways. A logician could use Gentzen-style presentations such as natural de-
duction or sequent calculi. Alternatively, logics could be proof-theoretically
introduced by methods such as resolution or tableaux, or even any other
method still waiting to be developed could be used. In this paper, we take
into consideration logics developed by means of axiomatic systems (i.e. a
Hilbert-style systems). These are our axiomatic formal systems. In order to
proceed from this syntactical perspective, we begin with somewhat standard
terminology in the realm of proof theory.
Let n be a positive integer and X a set (non-empty). We denote by
℘(n)(X), the set of subsets of X with cardinal n, i.e.,
℘(n)(X) := {A ⊆ X : |A| = n}.
An inference rule of degree n on X is a binary relation R such that
R ⊆ ℘(n)(X)×X.
If the pair ({x1, ..., xn}, x) ∈ R, we say that x is an immediate consequence
of {x1, ..., xn} in virtue of the application of the inference rule R. In this case,
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we can use the following notation:
x1, ..., xn
x
R.
Let R be a family of inference rules on X . We say that x is an immediate
consequence of {x1, ..., xn} if x is an immediate consequence of {x1, ..., xn} in
virtue of the application of an inference rule R ∈ R.
A formal system S is a triple S = (X,A,R) in which X is a non-empty set
whose elements are called formulas of S; A is a subset of X whose elements
are called axioms of S; and R is a finite family of inference rules on X .
Consider a formal system S = (X,A,R) and let A ⊆ X . A finite sequence
a1, ..., an of elements of X is called a S-deduction (or a deduction in S) from
A, if for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, it is the case that:
1. ai ∈ A or;
2. ai ∈ A or;
3. ai is a consequence of precedent formulas in the sequence by the appli-
cation of an inference rule.
We say that a formula a ∈ X is S-deducible from a set A of formulas if
there is a S-deduction, a1, ..., an, from A, such that a = an. To indicate that
a is S-deductible from A we use the following notation:
A ⊢S a.
Moreover, we say that a sequence a1, ..., an is a S-deduction of a from A.
If A is a subset of X , we denote by CnS(A) the set of all the elements of
X which are S-deducible of A, i.e:
CnS(A) := {a ∈ X : A ⊢S a}.
We say that A ⊆ X is S-consistent if and only if CnS(A) 6= X . Otherwise,
A is said S-inconsistent. We denote by CONS the set of all subsets S-
consistent of X . In our formal systems, we always suppose that ∅ is S-
consistent (or, equivalently, there is at least one S-consistent set). We say
also that A is a S-theory if and only if CnS(A) = A. THES denotes the set
of all S-theories and THE∗S refers to the set THES ∩CONS of S-consistent
theories.
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It is well known that the following properties hold:
(I) If a ∈ A, then A ⊢S a;
(II) If A ⊆ B and A ⊢S a, then B ⊢S a;
(III) If B ⊢S a and for all b ∈ B, A ⊢S b, then A ⊢S a;
(IV) A ⊆ CnS(A);
(V) If A ⊆ B, then CnS(A) ⊆ CnS(B);
(VI) CnS(CnS(A)) = CnS(A);
(VII) If A is S-consistent and B ⊆ A, then B is S-consistent;
(VIII) If A ⊢S a, then there exists A
′ ⊆ A finite such that A′ ⊢S a.
The notion described by CONS is eminently syntactical considering that
it deals with provability (i.e., deducibility). A formula is deducible - in a
given formal system - from a set of formulas by the application of inference
rules. As it is largely known, logics, in general, have two important sides,
which are indeed complementary, one of them is the proof-theoretical, the
other one is the semantical, which we consider in the next section.
3 Valuation structures
From the model-theoretical viewpoint, logics can also be introduced in very
different ways. A modal logician could use Kripke semantics to establish
truth-conditions for modal operators. Or an intuitionistic logician could use
the BHK-interpretation to analyze logical connectives. Many-valued matrices
are also at disposal to provide semantics for a given formal language. No
matter which semantical technology is used, what is important is to be able
to interpret a given language. Semantically, we use valuation structures. We
begin with some standard terminology (see, for instance, [6]).
A valuation structure is a pair (X,V) in which X is a non-empty set and
V is a family of functions of the form:
v : X → {0, 1},
which do not contain the constant function 1 : X → {0, 1}, such that 1(x) =
1 for all x ∈ X . Elements of V are called valuations for X .
Let A ⊆ X . The set of V-models of A, denoted by ModV(A), is given by:
ModV(A) := {v ∈ V : v(a) = 1 for all a ∈ A}.
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In a similar way, if a ∈ X , then the set of V-models of a is given by:
ModV(a) :=ModV({a}) = {v ∈ V : v(a) = 1}
1.
It is easy to see that ModV(∅) = V and ModV(X) = ∅. Moreover, if
A 6= ∅, then ModV(A) =
⋂
a∈AModV(a). It also holds that if A ⊆ B, then
ModV(B) ⊆ModV(A).
A subset A ⊆ X is called V-satisfiable if and only if ModV(A) 6= ∅, i.e,
there is a v ∈ V such that v(a) = 1, for all a ∈ A. Otherwise, A is called
V-unsatisfiable. Consider, now, a valuation structure (X,V) and let A ⊆ X
and a ∈ X . We say that a is a V-consequence of A if and only if all V-model
of A is also a V-model of a. In this case, we use the notation A |=V a.
Therefore, we have that:
A |=V a⇔ ModV(A) ⊆ModV(a).
In the same way we have done for formal systems, we define the set of
V-consequences of a subset A ⊆ X as:
CnV(A) := {a ∈ X : A |=V a}.
It is also well known that for valuation structures the following properties
hold:
(I) If a ∈ A, then A |=V a;
(II) If A ⊆ B and A |=V a, then B |=V a;
(III) If B |=V a and for all b ∈ B, A |=V b; then A |=V a;
(IV) A ⊆ CnV(A);
(V) If A ⊆ B, then CnV(A) ⊆ CnV(B);
(VI) CnV(CnV(A)) = CnV(A);
(VII) If A is V-satisfiable and B ⊆ A, then B is V-satisfiable.
Now, there are some known useful connections between axiomatic formal
systems and valuation structures which are important for our purposes here.
Let S = (X,A,R) be a formal system and consider a valuation structure
(X,V). Note that the carrier set of a valuation structure is precisely the set
X of S formulas. We say that the valuation structure (X,V) is sound with
respect to the formal system S if and only if for all A ⊆ X and a ∈ X we
1When v(a) = 1, we say that a is true under the valuation v. When that is not the
case, we say that a is false under the valuation v.
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have that: if A ⊢S a, then A |=V a. In this case, CnS(A) ⊆ CnV(A), for all
A ⊆ X .
We say that the valuation structure (X,V) is complete with respect to
the formal system S if and only if for all A ⊆ X and a ∈ X we have that: if
A |=V a, then A ⊢S a. Thus, CnV(A) ⊆ CnS(A), for all A ⊆ X .
We say that the valuation structure (X,V) is adequate with respect to
the formal system S if and only if it is sound and complete for S , i.e., for
all A ⊆ X and a ∈ X we have that: A ⊢S a if and only if A |=V a. In this
case, CnS(A) = CnV(A), for all A ⊆ X .
FACT: For all formal system S = (X,A,R) there is a valuation structure
(X,V) which is adequate for S.
This can be easily proved considering THE∗S, the class of S-consistent
theories, and taking as V the characteristic functions of elements of THE∗S.
Lemma 3.1 Let S = (X,A,R) be a formal system and (X,V) a valuation
structure. Then, it follows:
i. If (X,V) is complete for S, then A ⊆ X is S-consistent implies that A
is V-satisfiable;
ii. If (X,V) is sound for S, then A ⊆ X is V-satisfiable implies that A
is S-consistent.
Proof. i. Consider A ⊆ X , S-consistent and assume, by reductio ad absur-
dum, that A is V-unsatisfiable, i.e., ModV(A) = ∅. But, then, for all a ∈ X ,
it holds that A |=V a. Given completeness, it follows that A ⊢S a for all
a ∈ A, that is, A is S-inconsistent. (contradiction!).
ii. Consider A ⊆ X , V-satisfiable and assume, by reductio ad absurdum,
that A is S-inconsistent, i.e, CnS(A) = X . Given soundness, we have that
CnV(A) = X . So, ModV(A) ⊆ ModV(a), for all a ∈ X . Given that A is
V-satisfiable, let v ∈ ModV(A). Then, v ∈ ModV(a) for all a ∈ X , i. e.,
v(a) = 1 for all a ∈ X , that is, v is the constant function 1 (contradiction
with definition of V!). ✷
The notion of truth which is essential to semantics appear here as an in-
gredient of our valuation structures leading to the concept of semantical con-
sequence operation CnV . Up to now, we have settled basic usual terminology
in order to separate between proof-theoretical and semantical consequence
relations, and to show standard connections between them. From now on,
we introduce some original concepts that constitute the main contribution of
this paper.
6
4 Paradeduction
The philosophical motivation for the concept of paradeduction can be sum-
marized in the following motto: always reason with consistent sets. In
this sense, we provide a formalization of a practice already common when
we need to deal with inconsistent data. For instance, Bohr’s atomic model
claims that there are electrons orbiting an atom’s nucleus without radiating
energy. However, according to Maxwell’s equations - which are explicitly
incorporated in Bohr’s theory - an orbiting electron must radiate energy. In
this scenario, the calculations were done by informally splitting the informa-
tion into consistent subsets. The important thing to note is that in many
different situations, when facing an inconsistent set of informations, we intu-
itively deal with consistent subsets of the original one. Here, we are trying
to make this procedure explicit by formalizing it.
Let X be a set and consider a finite sequence of pairs
σ = (A1, a1), ..., (An, an)
such that Ai ⊆ X and ai ∈ X , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We introduce, based on σ, two
sequences given by:
Π1σ := A1, ..., An
Π2σ := a1, ..., an
which are sequences composed by the first and second elements of the original
sequence σ.
Consider, now, an axiomatic formal system S = (X,A,R) and a subset
A ⊆ X . A paradeduction in S from A is a finite sequence of pairs σ =
(A1, a1), ..., (An, an) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and Ai ⊆ X , ai ∈ X such that:
1. Ai is S-consistent, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
2. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have:
(a) ai ∈ A and Ai = {ai} (and, therefore, {ai} is S-consistent) or;
(b) ai ∈ A and Ai = ∅ or;
(c) ai is an immediate consequence of a set of preceding formulas
{ai1 , ..., aik} in the sequence Π2σ and Ai =
⋃k
j=1Aij (and, also, Ai
is S-consistent).
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To illustrate, consider the following set of informations:
A = {a ∧ b, a→ c, b→ ¬c}
If classical logic is the logic underlying A, it is obvious one can produce a
deduction such that A ⊢ c ∧ ¬c. However, in the case of a paradeduction, we
should take into account only consistent subsets of A (in this case, A is the
only set which should be disregarded). Then, a paradeduction would allow
to infer c and to infer ¬c, but never their conjunction, as only consistent sets
(of information) could be taken into consideration.
Lemma 4.1 Let (A1, a1), ..., (An, an) be a paradeduction in S from A ⊆ X.
Then, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Ai is S-consistent, Ai ⊆ A and Ai ⊢S ai.
Proof. By definition, each Ai, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is S-consistent. In addition,
considering the itens in the definition of a paradeduction, either Ai = ∅, or
Ai = {ai} or Ai is the union of the previous Ak’s . By induction, we have
that Ai ⊆ A, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Consider a paradeduction given by:
(A1, a1), ..., (An, an).
For i = 1, we have two cases:
1. a1 ∈ A. In this case, A1 = {a1} and we have, given the first property
of formal systems, that A1 ⊢S a1.
2. a1 ∈ A. Here, A1 = ∅ and we have, by the definition of deduction in S,
that A1 ⊢S a1.
Suppose that Ai ⊢S ai, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, and consider (Ak, ak). We have,
then, three cases: i. ak ∈ A; ii. ak ∈ A or iii. ak is obtained by an inference
rule. In the first two cases, an argument analogous to the one above shows
that Ak ⊢S ak. Now, for case (iii). Suppose ak is an immediate consequence
of {ai1, ..., ail} by the application of the rule R ∈ R. By induction hypothesis,
we have that:
Ai1 ⊢S ai1
...
Ail ⊢S ail
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And, moreover, Ak =
⋃l
j=1Aij is S-consistent. But, then, using properties
(II) and (III) of S-deducibility, the sequence ai1 , ..., ail, ak is an S-deduction
of ak from Ak =
⋃l
j=1Aij . That is, Ak ⊢S ak. ✷
Let S = (X,A,R) be a formal system, A ⊆ X and a ∈ X . We say that a is
S-paradeductible from A if there is a paradeduction in S, (A1, a1), ..., (An, an),
from A such that a = an. We use, to denote this fact, the notation:
A ⊢PS a.
Now we present a result that relates the notion of paradeducibility above
with a construction proposed in [4] of a paraconsistentization functor in the
category of consequence structures.
Proposition 4.2 Let S = (X,A,R) be a formal system such that A ⊆ X
and a ∈ X. Then, it holds that: A ⊢PS a if and only if there is A
′ ⊆ A,
S-consistent such that A′ ⊢S a.
Proof. (⇒) Suppose that A ⊢PS a. Then, there is a paradeduction in S given
by (A1, a1), ..., (An, an) from A such that a = an. By lemma 4.1, we have
that Ai is S-consistent, Ai ⊆ A and Ai ⊢S ai, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Thus, there
is an ⊆ A, S-consistent such that An ⊢S a.
(⇐) Suppose that there is A′ ⊆ A, S-consistent such that A′ ⊢S a. Consider,
then, a S-deduction of a from A′ given by:
a1, ..., an(= a).
Since all subset of A′ is S-consistent (property VII), it is easy to convert the
S-deduction above into a paradeduction in S:
(A1, a1), ..., (An, an)
making
Ai =


{ai} If ai ∈ A
′,
∅ If ai ∈ A,⋃
k Ak If ai is a consequence of previous formulas
A′ks associated.
Therefore, as A′ ⊆ A, it follows that A ⊢PS a. ✷
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Consider, now, a valuation structure (X,V). Let A ⊆ X and a ∈ X . By
definition, we already have that:
A |=V a⇔ ModV(A) ⊆ModV(a).
We define a relation of V-paraconsequence between A and a given by:
A |=P
V
a⇔ there exists A′ ⊆ A, V-satisfiable such that A′ |=V a.
We have the following result:
Theorem 4.3 Let S = (X,A,R) be a formal system and (X,V) a valuation
structure adequate for S. Then, for all A ⊆ X and a ∈ X, it is the case that:
i. A |=P
V
a implies that A ⊢PS a;
ii. A ⊢PS a implies that A |=
P
V
a.
Proof. i. Assume that A |=P
V
a. Then, there is A′ ⊆ A, V-satisfiable such
that A′ |=V a. By completeness, we have that A
′ ⊢S a and, by soundness and
lemma 3.1 (ii), A′ is S-consistent. Thus, by proposition 4.2, A ⊢PS a.
ii. Suppose that A ⊢PS a. By proposition 4.2, we have that there is A
′ ⊆ A,
S-consistent such that A′ ⊢S a. By soundness, we have that A
′ |=V a and,
by completeness and lemma 3.1 (i), A′ is V-satisfiable. Thus, A |=P
V
a. ✷
The lesson of the theorem above shows that if a given logic developed
by a formal system and a valuation structure is sound and complete, then
the paraconsistentized version of it also has these properties. These are good
news, especially because if one is dealing with a given theory which appears
to be contradictory, then there is a guarantee that the underlying logic can be
paraconsistentized in order to deal with these same contradictions as there is
no doubt that the resulting paraconsistentized logic also has good metalogical
properties and, therefore, replacing one explosive logic by a non-explosive one
is legitimate operation.
5 Conclusion
The contribution of this paper lies on the role consistent sets plays in sci-
ence, philosophy and reasoning in general. In ordinary life, we are recipients
of many contradictory informations, and sometimes our convictions and the-
ories are also contradictory. The main motto of this paper is that we can
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ignore pieces of contradictory information and concentrate only in consistent
parts of it: always reason with consistent sets of information. This is indeed
what occurs in Court of Law when a judge produces a decision or in philos-
ophy when someone reasons with contradictory viewpoints. So, discussions
regarding legal procedures as remarked in [3] or philosophical disputes can
be regulated by our methodology of concentrating in consistent sets. This
attitude seems to be similar to some operations in belief revision theory, es-
pecially those of contraction and revision studied and developed in [1]. It is
also possible to explain early uses of calculus in a similar way. However, in
this paper we have not explored these fruitful relationships further.
The approach developed here opens a line of research within the domain
of paraconsistent logics. Before the development of the method presented
here and elsewhere (see [4]), some forms of paraconsistentization had to be
“handcrafted”, in the sense that it had to be done individually for each
logic. For instance, Newton da Costa defined the consequence relation of
paraclassical logic P as: A |= a if and only if there is A′ ⊂ A, C-Consistent2,
such that A′ |= a. This is a specific procedure to turn classical logic into
a paraconsistent logic. Our work consists on a generalization of this idea,
allowing the abstraction of the notion of classically consistent to the notion
of consistent in a given logic, that is, Cn-Consistent.
Another example would be Rescher and Manor’s machinery for making
inferences from inconsistent premises3. Here, the consequence relation is not
restricted to mere consistent subsets of the original set, but to maximal con-
sistent subsets4. The details are not important here. What matters is that,
once again, we have a particular method for dealing with inconsistent infor-
mation. With respect to the work of Rescher and Manor our paper allows a
second level of abstraction. Not only we can make the notion of consistency
relative to a given logic, we can also replace the consistency constraints for
any other desired notion. Thus, Rescher and Manor’s machinery becomes
a particular case of our paraconsistentization method, when we change Cn-
Consistent notion for Cn-maximally consistent. Depending on our goal, we
could even replace the notion of consistency for some desired epistemic no-
2Where C denotes classical logic.
3Cf. [7].
4This gives rise to the notion of weak and strong consequence. A proposition a is a
weak consequence of a set A if and only if there is at least one A′ ⊆ A-maximal consistent,
such that a is a logical consequence of A′; and a is a strong consequence of A if and only
if it follows from all maximal consistent subsets of A.
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tion, and investigate the resulting logic. So, compared to this individual
ways of dealing with inconsistency that produces one paraconsistent logic
at a time, our approach permits this transformation on a “industrial scale”,
creating infinitely many paraconsistent logics.
In addition to that, our paper also presents some contributions to be-
lief revision theory. The main account of belief revision theory is the AGM
approach. In it, theories are defined as sets closed under the consequence
relation of classical logic. Thus any inconsistent theory is a trivial theory
and the source of the inconsistency cannot be localized, making contraction5
a somewhat arbitrary operation. Furhmann6 develops a framework that is
independent of classical logic. Hence, he can, in principle, accommodate
inconsistent theories. But only in the sense that it allows to localize the
inconsistency and then to perform a contraction to restore the theory’s con-
sistency. Indeed he claims that “restoring consistency is one of the major, if
not the principal reason for contracting a theory”7.
Paraconsistentization offers a different approach. When facing an in-
consistent theory, we can paraconsistentize the original explosive logic, and
reason with the consistent subsets of the theory. So, there is no need to con-
tract a belief from a theory. The pragmatic advantage of one approach over
the other has to be established on a case by case analysis. From a philosoph-
ical point of view, however, paraconsistentization shows that it is possible to
reason with inconsistent theories without removing any of its propositions.
To conclude, it is important to say that this paper showed that soundness
and completeness are invariant when logics are paraconsistentized. Other
step is the investigation of problems in complexity theory. For instance, given
a logic in which the satisfiability problem belongs to a given complexity class,
what happens in the case of paraconsistentizing this logic? A conjecture is
that complexity goes high, as the set of consistent subsets seems to increase.
However, we do not have a proof of this fact. We conjecture also that if
complexity decreases, then ways of paraconsistentizing can also be used to
study some problems in the domain of advanced theoretical computer science.
5The contraction of a proposition α from a theory Γ is a theory Γ′ that does not contain
- and does not imply - α, but it is in some sense similar to Γ.
6Cf. [5].
7[5], p. 187.
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